

REMARKS

Reconsideration of the present application is respectfully requested in view of the following remarks. Prior to entry of this response, Claims 1-37 were pending in the application, of which Claims 1, 14, and 26 are independent. In the Office Action dated October 12, 2004, the specification and the abstract were objected to, Claims 14 and 18-25 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and Claims 1-5 and 7-37 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claim 6 was objected to, but was deemed allowable if rewritten in independent form including all the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. Following this response, Claims 1-37 remain pending in this application. Applicant hereby addresses the Examiner's objections and rejections in turn.

I. Objection to the Specification

In the Office Action dated October 12, 2004, the Examiner objected to the specification due to missing status information of a co-pending application. The specification has been amended, and Applicant respectfully submits that the amendment overcomes this objection and adds no new matter.

II. Objection to the Abstract

In the Office Action, the Examiner objected to the Abstract of the Disclosure as being improper. The Abstract has been replaced with a Substitute Abstract attached to this Amendment, and Applicants respectfully submit that the Substitute Abstract overcomes this objection and adds no new matter.

III. Rejection of the Claims Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

In the Office Action, the Examiner rejected Claims 14 and 18-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Claim 14 has been amended and Applicant respectfully submits that the amendment overcomes this rejection of Claims 14 and 18-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and adds no new matter. Support for this amendment to Claim 14 can be found in the specification at least in paragraphs 46 and 63.

IV. Rejection of the Claims Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Using *Huang*

In the Office Action, the Examiner rejected Claims 1-5 and 7-37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 5,995,991 ("*Huang*") in view of what the Examiner alleges is obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. Applicant respectfully traverses this rejection.

Regarding Claim 1, the Examiner stated that *Huang* does not specifically disclose the claimed analyzer circuit configured to determine a first status of a first floating point operand and a second status of a second floating point operand. (See Office Action, page 3, lines 13-15.) In addition, the Examiner merely states that this missing element would be obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. (See Office Action, page 3, lines 19-23.) As a result, Applicant respectfully suggests that the Examiner has failed to make a *prima facie* case of obviousness. In order to make a *prima facie* case of obviousness, the Examiner must set forth prior art which teach or suggest every claim limitation. (See MPEP § 2143.)

If the Examiner continue to rely on this unsupported contention, Applicant respectfully requests the Examiner to provide concrete and explicit support.

Memorandum by Stephen G. Kunin, Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy (February 21, 2002)(stating that it is never appropriate to rely on common knowledge without evidentiary support as sole or principal evidence on which to base rejection); MPEP § 706 citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (providing that when a rejection in an application is based on facts within the personal knowledge of an Examiner, the data should be stated as specifically as possible, *and the facts must be supported*, when called for by the applicant, by an affidavit from the Examiner); MPEP § 2144.03 (providing that the Examiner may only take official notice of facts outside of the record which are capable of instant and unquestionable demonstration as being "well-known" in the art and, if the Applicant traverses such an assertion, the Examiner *should cite a reference* in support of his or her position.).

In light of the above remarks, Applicant asserts that the rejection of Claim 1 is not supported by the cited art and withdrawal of the rejection is respectfully requested. Applicant asserts that the rejections of Claims 14 and 26 are also not supported by the cited art and should be withdrawn for the reasons outlined above in response to the rejection of Claim 1.

Dependent Claims 2-5, 7-13, 15-25, and 27-37 are also allowable at least for the reasons above regarding independent Claims 1, 14, and 26, and by virtue of their respective dependencies upon independent Claims 1, 14, and 26. Accordingly, Applicant respectfully requests withdrawal of this rejection of dependent Claims 2-5, 7-13, 15-25, and 27-37.

V. Rejection of the Claims Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Using *Lynch*

In the Office Action, the Examiner rejected Claims 1-5 and 7-37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 6,009,511 ("*Lynch*") in view of what the Examiner alleges is obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. Applicant respectfully traverses this rejection.

Regarding Claim 1, the Examiner stated that *Lynch* does not specifically disclose the claimed analyzer circuit configured to determine a first status of a first floating point operand and a second status of a second floating point operand. (See Office Action, page 5, lines 5-7.) In addition, the Examiner merely states that this missing element would be obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. (See Office Action, page 5, lines 11-16.) As a result, Applicant respectfully suggest that the Examiner has failed to make a *prima facie* case of obviousness. In order to make a *prima facie* case of obviousness, the Examiner must set forth prior art which teach or suggest every claim limitation. (See MPEP § 2143.)

If the Examiner continues to rely on this unsupported contention, Applicant respectfully requests the Examiner to provide concrete and explicit support.

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called for by the applicant, by an affidavit from the Examiner); MPEP § 2144.03 (providing that the Examiner may only take official notice of facts outside of the record which are capable of instant and unquestionable demonstration as being "well-known" in the art and, if the Applicant traverses such an assertion, the Examiner *should cite a reference* in support of his or her position.).

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Dependent Claims 2-5, 7-13, 15-25, and 27-37 are also allowable at least for the reasons above regarding independent Claims 1, 14, and 26, and by virtue of their respective dependencies upon independent Claims 1, 14, and 26. Accordingly, Applicant respectfully requests withdrawal of this rejection of dependent Claims 2-5, 7-13, 15-25, and 27-37.

VI. Conclusion

In view of the foregoing remarks, Applicant respectfully requests the reconsideration and reexamination of this application and the timely allowance of the pending claims. The preceding arguments are based only on the arguments in the Office Action, and therefore do not address patentable aspects of the invention that were not addressed by the Examiner in the Office Action. The claims may include other elements that are not shown, taught, or suggested by the cited art. Accordingly, the

preceding argument in favor of patentability is advanced without prejudice to other bases of patentability.

Please grant any extensions of time required to enter this response and charge any additional required fees to our deposit account 06-0916.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: December 16, 2004

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